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he Vulnerability of the Northern Ireland Settlement:  




The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 is the cornerstone of stability in Northern Ireland. 
It is, however, vulnerable to changes in British-Irish relations and priorities. This article argues 
that this is at the root of recent crises and political stalemate in Northern Ireland. It argues that 
future shocks – not least the threat of British exit from the EU – are likely to increase instabi-
lity in Northern Ireland and in North-South relations.
Keywords: Northern Ireland, crisis, Good Friday Agreement, Brexit, North-South relations
Résumé
L’Accord du Vendredi Saint de 1998 est la pierre angulaire de la stabilité en Irlande du Nord. 
Cependant, il est sensible à l’évolution des relations entre le Royaume-Uni et l’Irlande et des priori-
tés. Cet article démontre que c’est là que se trouve la racine des crises récentes et du climat politique 
détérioré en Irlande du Nord. Par conséquent, les chocs à venir – dont la menace de la sortie du 
Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne n’est pas le moindre – sont susceptibles d’accentuer l’instabilité 
en Irlande du Nord et dans les relations nord-sud.
Mots clés : Irlande du Nord, crise, Accord du Vendredi Saint, Brexit, Relations nord-sud
Introduction
It was not unrealistic in May 1998 to see the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) 
– in the words of its Preface – as a “new beginning” in Northern Ireland, opening 
up to an agreed politics no longer reducible to ethnic power1. This beginning was, 
however, difficult to sustain. The institutions of Agreement, and in particular the 
consociational Assembly, became operational only in late 1999 and after a series 
of crises the Assembly was suspended in 2002 and dissolved in 2003. It was only 
1.  British and Irish Governments 1998. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations [https://www.dfa.ie/me-




under strong British and Irish government pressure that the Northern Irish parties 
accepted a slightly revised St Andrews Agreement in 2006 and began a new phase 
of devolved government in 2007. With the devolution of now radically reformed 
policing and justice to the Assembly in 2010, the implementation of the Good 
Friday/St Andrews Agreements was declared complete.
The declaration was premature. There was a re-birth of loyalist street protests 
in winter 2012, increased contention over Orange marches and near political 
breakdown in winter 2014. Once the British and Irish governments, for different 
reasons and in different ways, turned their attention away from Northern Ireland, 
a new phase of political struggle began. As future domestic, European and global 
problems take precedence over Northern Ireland in British and Irish concerns, 
crises are likely to recur. Possible British exit from the EU, to be put to referen-
dum in 2017, is likely to have such impact. Its implications for North-South rela-
tions and for settlement in Northern Ireland are the topic of this article.
• The vulnerability of the Good Friday Agreement
The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, with later amendments at St Andrews, 
is the focal point of agreement between the parties in Northern Ireland. Despite 
its length and detail, it was always a thin agreement, underspecified in important 
respects. In those areas where the parties could not reach agreement – in particu-
lar the reform of policing and justice – the issues were referred to independent 
commissions. The formulation of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland and the 
articulation of the principle of “parity of esteem” were referred to the new Nor-
thern Ireland Human Rights Commission. Disagreement and conflict on these 
matters were thus pushed into the future. Other provisions of the 1998 Agree-
ment were conditional. Decommissioning was, notoriously, conditional on the 
full implementation of the Agreement. Still other provisions remained open to 
radically conflicting interpretation: while constitutional theorists read the Good 
Friday Agreement as marking a new concept of sovereignty, based on the will 
of the people and concerned with principles of governance rather than which 
state had control, unionists pointed to the paragraphs of the Agreement which 
insisted that British sovereignty remained unchanged2. Thus the years imme-
diately after 1998 were characterized by recurrent crises over decommissioning, 
demilitarization, executive formation, policing, public symbolism, and the rights 
2.  E. Meehan, “he Changing British-Irish Relationship: he Sovereignty Dimension”, Irish Political Studies 29.1, 
2014, p. 58-75; J. Morison, “Democracy, governance and governability: Civic public space and constitutional 
renewal in Northern Ireland”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21.2, 2001, p. 287-310; D. Godson, Himself 
Alone: David Trimble and the Ordeal of Unionism, London, Harper Collins, 2004. 
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of the British government to suspend the Assembly3. These crises brought down 
the power-sharing executive and led to the electoral defeat of the more moderate 
parties (the Ulster Unionist Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party) 
by the more extreme parties in their blocs, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 
and Sinn Féin.
Far-reaching reforms of policing and justice were gradually implemented by 
the British government, in consultation with the Irish. In the new post 9/11 
climate, IRA decommissioning eventually was completed by 2005, and British 
demilitarization by 2006. With these issues resolved, the two governments were 
able to bring the parties back to agreement. At St Andrews in 2006, both govern-
ments made it clear to the dominant parties, the DUP and Sinn Féin, that if 
one of them turned away from agreement, the alternative would be worse for it. 
With the formation of a new devolved administration in 2007, and by 2010 with 
the devolution of policing and justice to Northern Ireland, implementation was 
declared complete.
It was not complete. There was no Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland and 
cultural and community relations issues had only partially been addressed. Most 
important of all, there remained radical disagreement between the Northern Irish 
parties on the way that key terms and principles of agreement would be inter-
preted. The parties disagreed profoundly about its overall geopolitical significance 
and as to what followed constitutionally, institutionally and culturally4. Did the 
GFA and St Andrews, as unionists asserted, strengthen the Union, or did they, as 
republicans believed, hollow it out? Did British sovereignty in Northern Ireland 
now have any cultural implications? Was the central feature of sovereignty now 
the principle of multi-levelled governance rather than the fact of state power? Was 
the basis of British sovereignty now the will of the people of Ireland, expressed in 
referenda? On these questions rested others: the meaning of “parity of esteem”; 
the appropriate forms of public symbolism.
The conflicting perspectives of unionists and nationalists on the principles 
of agreement meant that crises remained endemic. Crises occurred as each new 
issue arose, and as new circumstances gave rise to new questions of implementa-
tion, and without common principles the Northern Ireland parties were unable 
to resolve them. After 1998 adjudication on the meaning and principles of the 
Agreement had taken place informally, by British-Irish negotiation, in precisely 
3.  J. Ruane and J. Todd, “he Politics of Transition? Explaining Political Crises in the Implementation of the 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement”, Political Studies 49 (5), 2001, p. 923-940.
4.  J. Ruane and J. Todd, Ibid.; J. Tonge, J. M. Branif, T. Hennessey, J. W. McAuley and S. A. Whiting, he 
Democratic Unionist Party: From Protest to Power. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014; P. Shirlow, J. Tonge, 
J. McAuley and C. McGlynn, Abandoning Historical Conlict? Former Paramilitary Prisoners and Political Recon-
ciliation in Northern Ireland, Manchester, Manchester UP, 2011.
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the way that the broad terms of the Agreement had themselves been drafted. In 
effect, the principles of agreement were safeguarded by British-Irish definition and 
assertion of them.
This informal mode of safe-guarding the principles of the Agreement was ini-
tially functional, at least for the two states involved. It suited the modus operandi 
of the United Kingdom which functions without a written constitution, and 
where the habits of territorial governance have traditionally and to the present 
involved informal agreements, flexibility, consensus, rather than appeal to law5. 
It also suited the Irish state which had gained a degree of autonomy by skilful 
political balancing of its three large, powerful and significant partners – the UK, 
the US and the EU. The overwhelming political presence of the UK was balanced 
by a strong diplomatic initiative in the USA which at once reduced US support 
for violent republicanism and brought in the US on the side of constitutional 
nationalism, with the EU brought into play as a model of shared sovereignty and 
a legitimator of Irish aims6. The resulting settlement was seen as a diplomatic 
triumph for a small state which gradually and through dialogue and persuasion 
shifted the direction of British state policy in Northern Ireland7. Irish elites saw 
no reason to change a diplomatic style which had worked so well.
This informal British-Irish mode of implementing the Agreement and of adju-
dicating on its principles was, however, dependent on the states’ prioritization of 
Northern Ireland. After 2010, this weakened. Economic collapse in the South 
removed Northern Ireland from the forefront of Irish government attention. The 
British government’s attention was increasingly focused on the dangers of Scottish 
independence, and on increasing public dissatisfaction with the EU expressed in 
popular support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). With new 
administrations in each jurisdiction by 2011, a new strand of British-Irish policy 
was launched, focused this time on mutual British-Irish relations, rather than on 
Northern Ireland8.
5.  R. Rose, Understanding the United Kingdom: he Territorial Dimension, London, Longman, 1982; J. Bulpitt, 
Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: An Interpretation. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983; 
Robert Hazell (ed.), he state and the nations: the irst year of devolution in the United Kingdom, London, he 
Constitution Unit/Imprint Academic, 2000.
6.  E. Meehan, “he European context: changing forms of territorial politics in the United Kingdom”, in J. Coak-
ley, B. Lafan and J. Todd (eds.), Renovation or Revolution? New Territorial Politics in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, Dublin, UCD Press, 2005, p. 147-165. 
7.  J. Ruane and J. Todd, “History, structure and action in the settlement of complex conlicts: the Northern Ireland 
case”, Irish Political Studies, 29-1, 2014, p. 15-36; J. Todd, “hresholds of State Change: Changing British State 
Institutions and Practices in Northern Ireland after Direct Rule”, Political Studies 62 (3), 2013, p. 522–538.
8.  P. Gillespie, “he Complexity of British-Irish Interdependence”, Irish Political Studies, 29.1, 2014, p.37-57; J. 
Coakley and J. Todd (eds.), Breaking Patterns of Conlict in Northern Ireland: he British and Irish States, London, 
Routledge, 2014. 
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The process brought a new British-Irish rhetoric of “best friends” which por-
trayed British-Irish relations as unconditionally positive. Senior Irish and British 
officials and politicians emphasized the wonderfully improved relationship 
between Britain and Ireland, the important trading relations, the intermingling 
and interconnections of peoples, the family ties9. Paul Gillespie takes this as indi-
cative of a “normalisation” of British-Irish relations and a recognition by the Irish 
of the fact of “interdependence” rather than either dependence or independence. 
The removal of the territorial claim to Northern Ireland from the Irish Constitu-
tion is typically seen to have helped this normalisation10.
Relations in Northern Ireland, however, deteriorated as British-Irish oversight 
slackened. Northern Ireland was left to agree on remaining issues of implementa-
tion (rights, cultural policy, community relations policy) and new economic and 
heritage projects. Implementation was very slow. No Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland was agreed. The promise of a successor to the 2005 “Shared Future” stra-
tegic framework on community relations remained unfulfilled until 2010 when 
the executive produced a new consultation document on the topic (“Integration, 
Sharing and Cohesion”), quickly withdrawn in the face of criticism by the entire 
range of rights and community relations activists11. A new set of proposals was put 
forward in 2013 but it was overshadowed by increasing political conflict12. New 
EU funded projects were agreed after much discussion – a Maze Heritage Centre, 
on the site of the old Long Kesh/Maze prison where the republican hunger strikes 
had occurred and where loyalists had also been incarcerated, and the construc-
tion of a bridge (Narrow Water Bridge) to link South Down in Northern Ireland 
directly with North County Louth in the Irish state13. Unionists were uneasy with 
each project, and later withdrew their support from each, in the process losing 
EU funding. Meanwhile very substantive disagreement over the nature of the 
St Andrews Agreement of 2006 continued (see Tonge on DUP views14).
Conflict was initially over those aspects of the GFA and St Andrews that had 
still not been implemented – cultural equality (flags on council buildings), the 
9.  B. McDonagh, “Irish Friends and Friends of Ireland…”, London Speeches 2009-2013, Dublin, Institute of Irish 
and European Afairs, 2014.
10.  J. Coakley, “he Belfast Agreement and the Republic of Ireland”, in R. Wilford, (ed.), Aspects of the Belfast 
Agreement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 223- 244.
11.  J. Ruane and J. Todd, “From ‘A Shared Future’ to ‘Cohesion, Sharing and Integration’: An Analysis of North-
ern Ireland’s Policy Framework Documents”, Prepared for Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, 2011, [www.jrct.
org.uk/core/documents/download.asp?id=429].
12.  K. Hayward, “Deliberative Democracy in Northern Ireland: Opportunities and challenges for consensus in 
a consociational system” in J. Ugarizza and D. Caluwaerts (eds.), Democratic Deliberation in Deeply Divided 
Societies: From Conlict to Common Ground, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 11-34.
13.  he former was awarded 18 million euros under EU PEACE III funding, the latter 17 million euros under 
EU INTERREG funding.
14.  J. Tonge, J. M. Branif, T. Hennessey, J. W. McAuley and S. A. Whiting, he Democratic Unionist Party: From 
Protest to Power, op. cit.
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past (the Maze heritage centre), and parity of esteem (legislation on the Irish lan-
guage). Sections of the unionist population, sensing a political vacuum and the 
prospects of pushing back perceived republican gains, mobilized and won increa-
sing unionist sympathy over a whole range of issues to do with “culture” and 
“the past”. Belfast City Council’s decision in December 2012 no longer to fly the 
British flag every day of the year provoked months of loyalist mobilization and 
rioting and the protest gained wider unionist support15. Meanwhile the British 
and Irish governments stood back, intent to let the Northern Irish parties resolve 
the conflicts themselves. They failed to agree even after mediation attempts by US 
figures, Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan16. By late 2014 there was paralysis 
of shared government in Northern Ireland. It was resolved, temporarily at least, 
only when the British and Irish governments reengaged in negotiations with the 
Northern Ireland parties and convened the Stormont House talks. A new “Stor-
mont House” Agreement was reached in December 2014.
The sequence of events shows the vulnerability of settlement in Northern 
Ireland to external events and shocks, in particular to those that weaken British 
and Irish commitment to hands-on oversight of Northern Ireland affairs. Possible 
British exit from the European Union (Brexit) will only increase this vulnerabi-
lity. Gillespie is correct that it could change the game for unionists in Northern 
Ireland, and if it led to renewed mobilization for Scottish independence it could 
make a united Ireland preferable to marginalization in an English-dominated 
rest of the UK17. But that would require enough social stability to allow rational 
public assessment of the options. If instead Brexit rolled back the achievements 
of the Good Friday Agreement and weakened still farther British-Irish oversight 
of Northern Ireland, it is more likely to encourage unionist activists to mobilise 
against other aspects of the Agreement(s) with dangers of a return to conflict.
I argue below that in the short term Brexit is indeed likely to roll back the 
GFA. It is likely to impact on peace and stability in Northern Ireland by affecting 
North-South relations, in particular the role of the Irish border, the North-South 
institutions set up with the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998, in particular 
the Special EU Programmes Body set up to administer INTERREG and PEACE 
funding, and EU funding itself. In the remainder of the article I show why, and 
15.  P. Nolan, D. Bryan, C. Dwyer, K. Hayward, K. Radford, and P.  Shirlow, he Flag Dispute: Anatomy of 
a Protest, Belfast, Queen’s University Belfast, December 2014, [http://pure.qub.ac.uk/portal/iles/13748797/
he_Flag_Dispute_report_PRINTED.pdf], accessed 15 March 2015.
16.  P. Nolan, Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report. Number Two, Belfast, Community Relations Council, 
2013; P. Nolan, Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report. Number hree, Belfast, Community Relations 
Council, 2014.
17.  D. O Ceailleagh, and P. Gillespie (eds.), Britain and Europe: the Endgame. An Irish Perspective, Dublin, Institute 
of International and European Afairs, 2015. 
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I argue that imaginative cross-border responses are necessary and will be of value 
even if Brexit is avoided.
• North-South Relations
North-South relations are one pillar of peace and settlement in Northern 
Ireland. The need to open up these relations was a continuous strand of Irish 
government thinking at least from the time of Taoiseach Jack Lynch’s Foreign 
Affairs article18. A North-South momentum was central to the GFA; it is key to 
economic development on the island; and it is important for the easing of rela-
tions and the relaxation of attitudes on both sides of the border.
Mutual British and Irish EU membership helped North-South relations in a 
number of ways:
– Funding for peace and cross-border projects
– The form of North South implementation bodies
– Softer concepts of sovereignty and models of multi-levelled governance 
– Openness of cross-border crossing, employment, and trade
– Legitimation internationally of the GFA.
Brexit threatens this. It removes one North South implementation body set 
up with the GFA– the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) – and potentially 
undermines the others. It removes an important source of economic funding and 
cooperation. It threatens the openness of the border, and thus stands to increase 
political polarization. It may encourage a move back to more exclusivist concepts 
of sovereignty in Britain and among sections of unionists in Northern Ireland. 
And it threatens the institutions set up under the GFA, in particular the form and 
functions of the North-South implementation bodies, and the promise of equiva-
lent rights and equality provisions in the two jurisdictions.
A parallel threat to Nordic cooperation, institutionalized in the Nordic 
Council, occurred when Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. McQuaid19 
shows how the Nordic Council struggled to identify areas where it still made 
sense to cooperate. The consequences for North-South relations are likely to be 
even more serious, since on them depends not just cooperation but also internal 
stability in the North.
18.  J. M. Lynch, “he Anglo-Irish Problem”, Foreign Afairs, 50: 4, 1972, p. 601-617.
19.  S.D. McQuaid, “Nordic Horizons for a ‘Council of the Isles’? Instituting Regional Cooperation”, in Gerry 
Hassan and James Mitchell, (eds.), After Independence: he State of the Scottish Nation Debate, Edinburgh, 
Luath Press Limited, 2013.
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• Open borders, North-South trade and linkages
The openness of the North-South border is one of the great achievements of 
the last two decades. Together with the equalization process in Northern Ireland, 
this has removed the urgency of the Northern nationalist demand for a united 
Ireland. British sovereignty in Northern Ireland no longer impacts on the cultu-
ral identity or legitimacy of constitutional views of nationalists. Nor are they cut 
off from the rest of the island, and a path to greater institutional integration is 
in principle open, short of constitutional change. Recent surveys show that more 
nationalist voters now prefer to stay in the new Northern Ireland than move to 
a united Ireland20. This, however, is because British sovereignty no longer carries 
with it implications for internal power, cultural status or freedom of movement.
The opening of the Irish border depends on two pillars – peace and the EU 
framework. Without peace there would be constant security checks; without the 
EU there could be constant customs and immigration checks.
In the recent past – up until the 1990s – cross-border trade was badly affec-
ted by the border. At recent seminars in University College Dublin (10 December 
2009; 18 November 2009; 10 February 2010) business leaders remembered the 
difficulty of any cross-border trade in the 1970s and 1980s, the constant delays at 
the border, the danger, the intimidation. And it was business that played a major 
role in pushing for an opening of the border and the development of an island-
wide economy21.
Even more important, the openness of the border changes the quality of life 
on each side of it. The effect of violence was to cut the North off from the rest 
of the island: roads barred; farms cut in half; security checks; Northerners stig-
matized in the South; people in the border areas – North and South – constantly 
worried about security, constantly suspicious. It takes time to overcome this. Even 
in the early 2000s, distrust, silence and avoidance of discussion of North-South 
issues were evident in the border area22. Recent research in 2014 shows that this 
has at last changed: in the Louth-Dundalk area, for example, respondents say that 
political differences and the border itself are less important to them than before23. 
20.  D. Morrow, G. Robinson and L. Dowds, “he long view of community relations in Northern Ireland 
1989-2012”, ARK Research Report, 2013, [http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/the-long-view-of-community-relations-
1989-2012-dec-2013.pdf], accessed 19 January 2014.
21.  Sir G. Quigley, “North-South cooperation in 2013: towards an ever closer working relationship. Interview 
with Sir George Quigley”, Journal of Cross-Border Studies in Ireland, No 8, 2013, p 15-29; K. Hayward, and 
E. Maginnis, “he business of building peace: Private Sector Cooperation across the Irish Border”, Irish Politi-
cal Studies, 22.1., 2014, p. 154-175.
22.  J. Todd et al., “he moral boundaries of the nation: nation, state and boundaries in the Southern Irish border 
counties”, Ethnopolitics 5 (4), 2006, p. 365-382.
23.  Ongoing research by the author.
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It is possible to be relaxed about the border from each side, and thus again for 
British sovereignty to be less restrictive for Northern nationalists.
If there is Brexit then the border will again become important and perhaps 
more so since it will be a border of the EU. Unless the Irish state forgoes freedom 
of movement (of goods and peoples) within the EU, or the UK forgoes freedom 
of movement between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, they logically 
have to lessen freedom of movement across the Irish border. This impacts trade. It 
encourages a border-mentality of suspicion and surveillance. It will undoubtedly 
impact on the quality of life of border-dwellers and on the satisfaction of Nor-
thern nationalists.
• Institutions: the SEUPB and the North-South bodies
The North-South Council and the related implementation bodies are central 
parts of the architecture of the GFA, co-dependent with the Assembly.
The Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) is one of the six original North 
South implementation bodies. Other North South bodies set up as part of the 
North-South Council include Intertrade Ireland; Waterways Ireland; Irish Lights; 
Language Body; Food Safety (for discussion of their tasks and performance in 
the first five years, see Coakley, “The North-South relationship: Implementing 
the Agreement”, published in 200524). There is also significant institutional har-
monization on tourism, and small but increasing cooperation in health (opening 
Crumlin Children’s Hospital in Dublin for heart surgery for children from the 
North) and education.
The main function of the SEUPB is to “manage cross-border European Union 
Structural Funds programmes in Northern Ireland, the Border Region of Ireland 
and parts of Western Scotland”. It has managed the INTERREG and the PEACE 
(most recently PEACE III) programmes. Its present work involves implementing a 
new 240 million euro INTERREG cross-border co-operation programme for the 
Border Region of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Western Scotland for 2014-2020.
Setting up the North South Council and implementation bodies involved 
path-breaking work in harmonizing working conditions for Northerners and Sou-
therners within these institutions: this included complex details like equivalent 
pension entitlements for all employees. The bodies provide an original model of 
trans-state institution-building within the EU.
In the event of Brexit, the SEUPB will become redundant in its present form. 
Indeed it is likely that the wider institutional architecture of the North-South bodies 
24.  J. Coakley, “he North-South relationship: Implementing the Agreement”, in J. Coakley, B. Lafan and 
J. Todd (eds.), Renovation or Revolution? New Territorial Politics in Ireland and the United Kingdom, Dublin, 
UCD Press, 2005, p. 110-131.
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will be challenged as greater divergence in laws and policy requirements follow a 
British exit from the EU. If freedom of trade is restricted, InterTrade Ireland may 
be unable to fulfill its remit to foster cross border trade. If the UK moves away from 
EU regulations on employment, so the internal structure of the North South bodies 
will need to be reconfigured. All of this reacts back on the GFA itself, challenging 
the structure of the Agreement. It is therefore politically destabilizing.
The initial question concerns the role of the SEUPB if the UK leaves the 
EU. In the most benign scenario, the two governments might negotiate with the 
EU a special position for Northern Ireland to enable a continued drawdown of 
funding. To negotiate this will require an urgency of focus and a convergence of 
aims between the governments, the more difficult because such a special position 
for Northern Ireland is likely to require some matching British financial contribu-
tion. Even if existing EU funding continues, the drawdown of new funding – and 
thus the continued role of the SEUPB into the future – is far from guaranteed. 
And even in the most benign of circumstances, the new challenges will require 
significant amendments within the North South institutions and in their remit 
(depending on UK changes in policy). Short of the most benign of circumstances, 
it will be politically imperative to reconfigure the form, nature and remit of the 
North-South implementation bodies and the role of the North-South Council: in 
effect it will be necessary to revise the North-South institutions set up under the 
GFA in order to keep to the principles of the Agreement.
• Funding – INTERREG and PEACE funding
If the UK leaves the EU, then EU funding for cross border projects will be 
threatened. SEUPB is responsible for EU funding of up to one million Euro, 
although with the decline of the peace programmes the actual funding has itself 
declined: as noted above, recent investment includes an INTERREG grant of a 
quarter of a million euros over 6 years.
Important as these contributions are, they pale beside the British subvention 
to Northern Ireland. Calculating the “subvention” is controversial depending 
on whether or not we include universal benefits across the United Kingdom (eg 
unemployment, health)25. But public expenditure in Northern Ireland far outruns 
revenue generated from Northern Ireland, in 2010-11 by £ 9.6 billion. However 
we calculate the “subvention” within this, it dwarfs EU and North-South funding.
It is sometimes argued that EU funding is thus insignificant to Northern 
Ireland. But this neglects its social and political as well as economic importance. 
25.  See [http://www.nicva.org/sites/default/iles/d7content/attachments-articles/calculating_public_spending_and_rev-
enue_in_northern_ireland_0.pdf], accessed 11 April 2015.
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It supports cross-community and North-South endeavors and contact: so, for 
example, numerous small bodies have benefitted from PEACE funding, from 
community groups in the border area to local museums with cross-border edu-
cational projects. These small local projects have a cumulative effect in impro-
ving cross community and cross border relations. There are also larger projects 
of potential economic as well as social importance. If the UK votes itself out of 
the EU a Conservative government committed to financial rectitude is unlikely to 
spend on such projects even if they are only a small proportion of current expen-
diture on Northern Ireland.
Moreover even were funding available – as it was for Narrow Water Bridge 
and the Maze Heritage Centre – drawing it down depends on political agree-
ment. As political agreement declines – and I have argued that this is highly likely 
with Brexit – a vicious circle develops with less funding available and less funding 
demanded for initiatives which create more open relations and more satisfied 
citizens.
• New North-South linkages
In the event of Brexit, there will be a major impact on North-South relations. 
The border will become more important in trade, in interaction, and probably in 
perception and ideology. The North-South implementation bodies are likely to be 
weakened and perhaps rendered redundant. EU funding stands to be lost. These 
losses will be significant economically and socially, and even more so politically 
since the GFA – and stability in the North – rests on a North-South dimension.
It will be urgent to compensate for these losses: by opening new cross-bor-
der linkages and institutions; by negotiating new areas of funding; and by using 
the special position of Northern Ireland within the UK to maintain EU support 
for North-South projects and relations. Even if Brexit does not happen, it is for 
everyone’s benefit to reinvigorate North-South interrelations within the agreed 
constitutional parameters of the GFA. In the 1990s it was common to say that 
the momentum of the peace process had to be sustained: like riding a bicycle, if 
the momentum stopped one fell off. That momentum was (nearly) stopped from 
2012-4. Strengthening North South relations in new circumstances can renew the 
momentum, and provide greater stability in both parts of the island in the event 
of future exogenous shocks. The following areas are important
Special EU funding for North-South projects
Could a British government after Brexit accept that Northern Ireland (in its 
North-South relations) have a different relation with the EU than the rest of the 
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UK? This would be constitutionally anomalous, but not insurmountably so. The 
past thirty years have seen growing flexibility in concepts of sovereignty within 
the UK, and most particularly in respect to Northern Ireland26. Northern Ireland, 
while remaining under British sovereignty, is already constitutionally anomalous 
within the UK because of (i) the guarantee in the GFA that British sovereignty 
rests on the consent of a majority (ii) the North-South strand of the GFA which 
provides for small but exemplary forms of institutional integration (iii) the role of 
the Irish state in conflict management in Northern Ireland, agreed in the Anglo 
Irish Agreement of 1985 and since further developed.
Could the EU give special treatment to North-South relations even after 
Brexit? The EU has consistently proven itself sympathetic to peace-building in 
Northern Ireland, conditional on this being within a framework agreed by the 
two governments. And while special EU treatment for Northern Ireland would 
undoubtedly involve some British financial input, the alternative – if it led to 
political breakdown – would be more costly for the British government.
In recognition of these considerations, the Irish parliamentary Committee on 
European Affairs27 has called for bilateral British and Irish negotiation to have the 
special position of Northern Ireland in the UK recognised in an EU context.
New political linkages and modes of representation
New political linkages and modes of representation could counterbalance the 
effects of Brexit. Garret FitzGerald once suggested that the Republic represent Nor-
thern farmers in the EU. Northern farmers might well welcome some special sec-
toral linkages with the South. Indeed one might envisage complex linkages for dif-
ferent sectors, some between North and South, some between Northern Ireland and 
Scotland if as is probable the Scots move towards independence after Brexit28.
Other linkages might also be imagined – for example between Northern 
border constituencies and MEPs in Southern border areas.
Of course here we come into complex legal territory in each jurisdiction and 
in the EU. But the lessons of the last thirty years of British-Irish negotiations are 
that innovative and mutually beneficial agreements can be developed by working 
within this complex and sensitive territory29.
26.  E. Meehan, “he European context: changing forms of territorial politics in the United Kingdom”, 2005, op. 
cit.; E. Meehan, “he Changing British–Irish Relationship: he Sovereignty Dimension”, 2014, op. cit. 
27.  Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on European Afairs Report: UK/EU Future Relationship: Implications 
for Ireland, June 2015, [http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/euafairs/23-6-15-Report-UK-EU-
Future-Relations.pdf], accessed July 20 2015.
28.  P. Gillespie, “he Complexity of British-Irish Interdependence”, 2014, op. cit.
29.  J. Ruane and J. Todd, “History, structure and action in the settlement of complex conlicts: the Northern 
Ireland case”, 2014, op. cit.; J. Ruane and J. Todd, “History, structure and action in the settlement of complex 
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multi-levelled action
It is clearly necessary to have action at many levels:
– Top-level British-Irish planning for different eventualities. 
– North-South discussions on how the potential losses of Brexit can be coun-
ter-balanced. Here the new North-South parliamentary body set up in 2012, 
together with the North-South Council, provide forums for discussion.
– Strong involvement of interest groups with common cross-border interests, 
for example business, farmers, health sector.
– Strong public involvement. The recent Constitutional Convention and Irish 
Citizens’ Assembly suggests that carefully constructed North-South citizens’ dis-
cussion might show ways of opening new linkages to mutual benefit30. 
– Comparative learning: The Nordic Council, and in particular the Freedom 
of Movement Council that it set up in 2014 to remove obstacles to freedom of 
movement across the Nordic states, including between EU and non-EU member 
states, gives a model of how some of the effects of EU borders can be compensa-
ted by an additional layer of regional integration31. 
• Conclusion
There is little internal momentum within the Northern Ireland settlement. It is 
prone to crisis when not watched over by the British and Irish states. In this respect, 
preparing for Brexit can strengthen the settlement by increasing the strength of 
North-South linkages, within the constitutional constraints of the GFA.
It has been tempting to put the problem aside until after the British general 
election, or after British negotiations begin within the EU, or after a referendum. 
However a reworking of the North-South dimension can be of mutual benefit 
even if Brexit does not happen. Re-starting a momentum of mutual dialogue and 
mutual benefit can strengthen settlement in Northern Ireland, and allow it to 
survive the inevitable sequence of future shocks, of which Brexit may only be one.
conlicts: the Northern Ireland case”, 2014, op. cit.
30.  J. Suiter, D. Farrell and E. O’Malley, “When do deliberative citizens change their opinions? Evidence from 
the Irish citizens’ Assembly”, International Political Science Review, 2014. DOI: 10.1177/0192512114544068.
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